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1. INTRODUCTION
PRC Speas, assisted by David R. Bornemann Associates, Inc., has conducted
analyses of flight plan data for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration-Lewis Research Center under Contract #NAS3-22748.
The objective of these analyses was to assess the potential improvement
in fuel savings which may be possible from improved meteorological
data. Flight plans calculated from prescribed input parameters and
meteorological data sets were used as quantitative indicators of differ-
ences in fuel burn and other relevant parameters. Flight plan data were
provided by two airlines which will be referred to as "BLUE Airlines" and
"RED Airlines" throughout this report in order to maintain anonymity.
ThF- work program under this contract was divided into four tasks. This
volume of the final report presents the findings of Task IV. 	 Task IV
consisted of analysis of and commentary on significant forecast errors
that occurred on those days in 1979 for which data were collected for 	 .
Task i of this study.
Subsequent sections of this volume describe the methodology for the Task
IV analysis and present the findings.
J
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2. SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS
In the Task IV analysis, differences between flight plan winds and
temperatures based on the National Weather Service forecast and on the
verifying analysis from Task I were used as indicators of dates and
geographic areas for which significant forecast errors may have occurred.
The objective of Task IV was to review available forecasts and verifying
analyses valid at the forecast time so as to explain forecast errors
which occurred and to discuss their significance.
Days on which the forecast resulted in flight plan segments with wind
direction differences greater than 30 degrees, speed differences greater
than 20 kts., or temperature differences greater than 5°C, between
the plan on the forecast and the plan on the verifying analysis, were
designated for further analysis.
Key findings of this analysis were:
•	 BLUE Airlines data indicated that forecast errors that were judged
to be significant and extensive existed on 13 of the 33 arbitrarily
selected days included in the study. RED Airlines data indicated
that significant errors existed on an additional 18 days, but all
but twoof these were excluded from further analysis because much of
the RED data were found to be erroneous and unreliable.
• On 14 days of the 15 considered to have significant forecast errors,
wind speeds in an area of maximum winds were underestimated by at
least 20 to 25 kts., and on at least four days by more than 50 kts.
3.
• There is a tendency to repeat the same forecast errors from prog to
prog even though the intervening analysis showed clearly that errors
had occurred.
• Five days of the 15 were found to have significant errors in the
forecast of the location, movement, development or intensity of the
major synoptic scale features.
• Some perceived "forecast errors" from the flight plan comparisons
could not be verified by visual inspection of the corresponding
National Meteorological Center forecast and analyses charts, and it
is likely that they were the result of weather data interpolation
techniques or some other data processing procedure in the airlines'
fli ght planning systems. This was especially apparent in areas
where there was a sharp gradient in the wind direction or wind
speed.
A summary discussion of the analysis and other findings follows.
The comparisons of flight plan segments from Task I identified 2,349
segments for which the wind or temperature differences exceeded the
limits (30 degrees, 20 kts. or 5°C). Many of these "error segments" were
widely scattered or isolated geographically and of little significance.
Others were clustered and consistent with other adjacent error segments.
The isolated error segments were ignored, while those that appeared in
patterns of synoptic scale or large areal extent were identified for
further analysis.
For those dates and geographic regions so identified, other data pro-
vided by NASA were reviewed. These normally consisted of the National
Meteorological Center (NMC) 250 mb. forecasts and analyses valid at OOOOZ
on the day under review and OOOOZ on the following day. 250 mb. level
analyses prepared by an airline were also used for some days.
4.
The RED and BLUE Airlines data from Task I initially identified forecast
errors on 31 of the 33 arbitrarily selected days included in the study.
In Section 4 of this volume a summary is presented for each day which
gives the number of RED and BLUE Airlines flights, the number of error
segments, the areas in which forecast errors occurred and a discussion of
the extent and significance of the errors.
Further review of the data revealed an inconsistency in the RED and BLUE
Airlines data from Task I.
A substantially higher number of error segments were found for RED
Airlines even though it operated fewer flights. For the BLUE Airline
there were 853 flights and 908 error segments for an average of 1.06 per
flight. For the RED Airline 262 flights encountered 858 error segments
	
	 I
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for an average of 3.2 per flight. If the Mid East segments are excluded
the BLUE Airlines error segments are reduced to 528 for 651 flights, or
an average of 0.8 per flight.
Since both airlines used the same weather data, it is obvious that there
are differences in their interpolation algorithms since only one detected
apparent "forecast errors" when both operated flights through the same
area.
Further investigation showed that the RED Airlines winds were often
completely incompatible with either the forecast or the verifying
i{
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analysis.	 (For example, see the data for November 26 in Section 4.)
Wind direction errors of up to 180 degrees occurred on days, and in
geographic areas, on which the BLUE Airlines data showed few or zero
errors.
It was decided that some er:, or in the data interpolation or flight
planning algorithm in the RED system was causing an apparently erroneous
identification of error segments.
When the BLUE data alone were considered, 10 of the 33 days were found
to have forecast errors of significant magnitude and areal extent. For
three additional days, the BLUE Airlines error segments indicated
relatively minor forecast errors but, upon visual inspection of the
forecast and analysis charts, it was determined that -ignificant errors
existed but were not detected by the BLUE Airlines flights which were not
routed near the forecast error area.
Even though most of the forecast errors indicated by the RED flight plans
were discarded because they were not consistent with the other data, on
two days the errors indicated by RED Airlines were confirmed by visual
inspection of the charts and were judged to be significant.
Thus, between the RED and BLUE data, 15 of the 33 arbitrarily chosen
forecast rerun days were found to have significant forecast errors.
6.
2.1 FORECAST ERRORS
	
	 j
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Data for the 15 days identified two types of repetitive and significant
errors.
	 These were underestimated wind speeds, and repetition of
forecast errors.
n
Underestimated Wind Speeds
A persistent error found throughout the analysis was the underestimation
of wind speeds.
	 In 14 of the forecast error situations the forecast
maximum winds were at least 20 to 25 kts. and sometimes more than
50 kts. lighter than actual. Wind speeds further away from the core were
proportionately in error out to the 70 kt. or 50 kt. level where the
errors become insignificant.
Wind speed forecast errors were also found on five additional days but
these were judged to be less significant errors because of their lesser
magnitude and extent.
Repetition of Forecast Errors
In the analysis it was noted that apparent forecast errors were not
corrected on subsequent forecasts. Review of the forecasts issued 12 or
24 hours later showed that errors such as the wind speed errors noted
above were carried from prog to prog even though the intervening analysis
showed many actual observations of data that were in disagreement with
the forecast. A forecast, for example, that showed a maximum wind
isotach of 90 kts. would be followed by another with a 90 kt. maximum
7.
isotech value even thoL:y winds of 125 to 135 kts. were observed at
the valid time of the prog.	 Sometimes, the same situation would have
occurred 24 hours earlier and 24 hours later, as well, with the forecasts
giving no indication of the existence of the stronger winds.
This repetition of the forecast errors was confirmed on five days of the
33 reviewed. There were indications that forecast errors were repeated
on many of the other days but it was not possible to confirm this since
data were only retained for the days involved in the study, and thus,
data for the adjacent forecast periods were not always available.
Location of Synoptic Features
Even though there were frequent errors in wind speed forecasts, as noted
above, the forecasts of the location, movement, development a.id intensity
of synoptic scale features were usually quite accurate.	 On five days
the forecasts were fudged to have significant errors of this nature.
Typically, these consisted of such errors as underestimating the extent
of deepening of a trough which resulted in an extensive area of wind
direction errors. On three additional days, less significant errors of
this type were noted.
2.2 OTHER ERRORS
Analysis of the error segments and visual inspection of the corresponding
forecast and analysis charts found several other errors which may have
been perceived as forecast errors but are likely the result of some
8.
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procedure or feature of the airline flight planning systems. These are 	 a,
discussed below.
Time Interpolation and Choice of Prot'
It was apparent from the analysis that time interpolation between
weather progs, or the choice of prog on which the flight plan is based,
caused some of the wind differences between the forecast and analysis,
especially in rapidly changing situations.
	
On several days, (for
example, see the discussions for August 24 or September 7 and Figure 4-6
in Section 4) review of the OOOOZ forecast and analysis, and review of
the forecast and analysis valid 24 hours later showed that the forecasts
were highly accurate, but flight plans based on an intervening forecast,
such as the 180OZ, resulted in error segments. 	 It is possible that in
these few cases there were no forecast errors at all but rather that the
flight planning algorithm or the analysis methodology somehow resulted in
forecast winds being compared to actual winds valid at a different time.
Average Winds in Areas of Sharp Gradient
The methodology by which these airlines develop the average winds for a
flight plan segment may have resulted in some "forecast errors". Both
airlines use some scheme to determine an average wind for a flight plan
segment from adjacent Marsden Square data. Since some flight plan
segments can traverse more than one Marsden Square, in areas of sharp
gradient flight plan winds may be developed by averaging very light winds
with very strong winds, depending on the algorithm being used.	 This
9.
averaging process appears to have resulted in some apparent forecast
errors on the flight plans, which do not appear when one visually
compares the forecast and analysis charts. An example of this problem is
presented in the discussion for November 9 and in Figure 4-19.
This problem applies equally to situations with a pronounced wind
direction gradient.	 Many forecast error segments were found near the
centers of highs, lows, ridges or troughs where the wind direction
changes rapidly with distance.
Mid-East Errors
Significant "forecast errors" were noted on 11 days in the Mid East area
by BLUE Airlines.	 Even on other days there were usually some error
segments but they were fudged to be relatively insignificant and not
worth further analysis. Often these "errors" were on the same routes day
after day - routes through Yugoslavia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
The charts that were available did not extend far enough east to be of
help in explaining the forecast errors in this area. 	 However, it is
believed that the persistent, almost daily, occurrence of forecast errors
in this area is significant on its own even if the significance of the
individual daily errors cannot be determined. Since it is difficult to
explain how a forecast error should occur in the same location so often,
it was assumed that this was the result of some anomaly in the BLUE
Airlines system.
3. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The objective of Task IV was to identify and comment on forecast errors
from the Task I analysis. During the computer processing of the data in
Task I, flight plan segments with a wind speed difference of 20 knots or
more, wind angle difference of 10 degrees or more, or a temperature
difference of 5'C or more between the plan on an operational forecast and
the plan on the verifying analysis were identified for further analysis
in Task IV.
Approximately 118,000 flight plan segments were considered in this
analysis and some 19,000 were identified as exceeding one or more of the
three forecast error criteria.	 The objective of this task was not to
explain the reason for the forecast error for each of these 19,000
segments but rather to explain forecast errors over larger areas that
were of synoptic scale significance. The individual flight plan segments
were only to be used to identify the areas that required further manual
analysis.
It was decided, therefore, with the approval of the NASA project manager
that the 19,000 forecast error segments, representing 16 percent of all
segments, probably indicated that the forecast error criteria were too
stringent and that the objective of Task IV would still be served if the
10.
wind angle difference criterion were eased. The segment comparison was
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then rerun using 30 degrees difference in wind angle as the indicator of
a forecast error. The wind speed and temperature criteria were kept at
20 knots and VC, respectively.
Using these criteria, 2,349 segments were identified as exceeding one
or more of the limits.	 These data were then reviewed manually, and
subjectively, to determine the days and geographic areas for which
significant forecast errors occurred which should be analyzed further.
In general, isolated segments with forecast errors were ignored unless
some adjacent segments supported the conclusion that a significant
synoptic scale error existed in the area. 	 Similarly, areas with large
wind direction errors but with very low speeds (under 10 knots) were
general l y assumed to be insignificant unless supported by errors in
adjacent segments.
Except for these two types of occurrances, however, most other segment
errors were assumed tr be significant enough to warrant further analysis.
Since data from both BLUE Airline and RED Airline flight plans were
included in the analysis some flight plan segments may indicate forecast
errors that are really just the result of differences in the weather data
interpolation algorithm between the two systems. There were some days on
which one system identified numerous forecast "errors" while the other
identified very few. These cases were always retained for further
analysis to determine whether or not there was a real forecast error.
Figure 3-1 lists the days and areas of the world that were identified for
further review.	 The number of flights by each airline and the number
of segments for which the forecast vs. verifying analysis difference
exceeded the criteria are also included along with the nominal forecast
valid time and the predominant direction of traffic flow on the North
Atlantic. (The number of segments listed is the number of unduplicated
segments with forecast errors. If two or more flights traversed the same
segment and reported the same wind or temperature error the segment was
only counted once.	 Similarly, those days which only included a few
isolated segment errors are not listed. Thus, the totrl number of
segments in Figure 3-1 does not add to 2,349.)
For each day listed in Figure 3-1, PRC Speas reviewed additional data
provided by NASA.
	
These data normally included the National Weather
Service 24-hour 250 mb. prog, the 24-hour tropopause-vertical wind shear
prog, and the 250 mb. analysis valid at the time of the 250 mb. prog
above. For some days, especially during October and November, each of
these progs and analyses was not always available and a forecast valid 12
hours later or earlier was reviewed to explain what might have happened
during the period for which the data were missing. 250 mb. operational
analyses prepared by an airline were also used to substitute for missing
12.
data. In certain cases, where preliminary analysis indicated that it was
,j
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Figure 3-1
TASK IV RESULTS
DATES AND AREAS WITH FORECAST ERRORS
Segments Prog
No. of Flights With Errors Type Valid
Date BLUE RED BLUE RED Flow Time Areas With Forecast Errors
1/15 12 17 0 14 E/B 06 NAT, E. Canada
1/19 0 20 0 8 E/B 06 NAT, No. Sea
8/6 19 12 15 58 E/B 06 NAT,	 E.	 Europe,	 E. Canada
8/7 27 8 45 29 W/B 18 NAT, Europe
8/10 36 5 93 44 E/B 06 NAT, Mid East
8/13 25 0 36 0 W/B 18 NAT,	 Europe, Mid East
8/14 32 9 60 42 E/B 06 NAT, Europe, Mid East
8/17 38 0 87 0 W/B 18 NAT, Europe, Mid East
8/20 24 7 29 13 E/B 06 Europe
8/24 36 10 25 17 W/B 18 NAT, Mid East
9/7 34 10 42 102 W/B 18 NAT, Mid East, W. United States
9/10 0 12 0 33 E/B 06 NAT, Canada
9/14 21 2 19 7 W/B 18 NAT,	 E. United States
9117 30 8 23 19 E/B 06 NAT, W. Europe
9/21 34 11 66 41 W/B 18 NAT, Europe, Mid East
9/24 0 6 0 16 E/B 06 E. United States,	 E. Canada
9/28 44 13 64 53 W/B 18 NAT, Europe
10/5 0 8 0 31 W/B 18 NAT, E. United States
10/8 18 0 33 0 E/B 06 NAT, Mid East
10/i2 27 7 14 10 W/B 18 NAT, E. Canada
10/15 21 9 34 45 E/B 06 NAT, Europe
10/19 29 6 25 18 W/B 18 NAT, Mid East
10/26 20 5 18 15 W/B 18 Europe,	 E. Canada, Mid East
11/2 31 3 42 20 W/B 18 NAT, Europe, Mid East
11/5 28 2 2 24 E/B 06 NAT
11/9 42 13 21 10 W/B 18 Europe, United States
11112 33 6 8 40 E/B 06 NAT
11/16 34 10 21 56 W/B 18 NAT, Europe
11/19 34 12 8 11 E/B 06 NAT, Europe
11/23 44 14 28 35 W/B 18 Europe, Canada
11/26 26 7 5 37 E/B 06 NAT,	 E. Canada, W.	 Europe
Source: PRC Speas Analysis
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appropriate, certain additional data such as the North Atlantic Organized
Tracks were considered.
In the next section of this report, each case is discussed separately.	
^i
The forecast error segments are identified, the snyoptic situation is	
i
summarized, and the significance of the errors is discussed.
^i
4. FINDINGS
Findings of the Task I4 analysis are presented on the following pages.
The cases which were listed in Figure 3-1 are presented in date order.
Each day that was reviewed is discussed here even though it was decided
subsequently that for some days data anomalies attributed to the RED
Airlines weather data processing algorithm erroneously identified
forecast errors.	 In each case the areas with forecast errors are
defined and the extent and magnitude of the errors are summarized. The
significance of the errors is discussed and any other comments deemed
appropriate are presented. Figures are used to depict graphically
some situations where it was believed they would contribute to better
understanding of the discussion. The discussion and figures presented
here are meant to provide the reader with a very brief description of the
forecast errors. A thorough treatment would require reference to more
data than would be practical to reproduce here.
For each day reviewed, the number of flights that provided data is
given along with the number of flight plan segments that exceeded one or
more of the forecast error criteria. These are referred to as "error
segments" in the discussion and are those segments for which the wind or
temperature differences between the flight plan on the forecast and the
flight plan on the analysis exceeded 30 degrees, 20 knots, or 5°C.
15.
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In the remainder of this section of the report winds will be presented
in the format DDD/FFF where DDD is the direction in degrees and FFF (or	 a
FF if appropriate) is the speed in knots.
	
The range of wind values
over some geographic area will be presented as ODD to ODD/FFF to FFF.
Differences between winds on the plan based on the forecast and the plan 	 a
based on the analysis will be presented in the same format. Temperatures
will be presented in the format TT (or TT to TT for a range of values)
where TT is degrees Celsius.
17.
DATE: January 15, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 12 flights - zero error segments
RED Airlines - 17 flights - 14 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wind	 Error
Maine, New Brunswick,	 200 to 220/50 to 70 	 20 deg. and 20 to 25 kts.
Nova Scotia
Vicinity of 51N45W 	 340/90	 10 deg. and 20 kts.
Vicinity of 53N between	 200 to 220/100 to 115	 20 to 30 kts.
30W and 15W
BLUE Airlines Data
No Errors
DISCUSSION: The only data from this date that were available for review
were the 24-hour 250 mb. forecasts valid at OOZ on January
15th and 16th. The corresponding analyses we.,e not avail-
able and without them it is difficult to comment on the
apparent forecast errors listed above or even to confirm
that errors did in fact exist and were not merely the
result of anomalies in the time interpolation algorithm in
the RED Airlines flight planning system.
In any case, based upon the small number of error segments
and on the BLUE Airlines findings, it is likely that the
errors were not significant.
DATE: January 19, 1979 Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: RED Airlines - 20 flights - 8 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
Location	 Wind	 Error
Area bounded by 53N,	 270 to 290/85 to 145	 20 to 35 kts.
55N, 40W and 20W
North Sea	 290/40	 30 deg.
DISCUSSION: For this date only the 250 mb. forecasts valid at OOZ on
January 19th and 20th were available for review. As was
the case with the January 15th data, it was not possible to
comment on the significance or extent of the relatively few
and minor forecast errors listed above without access to the
corresponding actual analyses for that day.
18.
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DATE: August 6, 1979	 Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 19 flights - 15 error segments
RED Airlines - 12 flights - 58 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Vicinity of New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia,
and Newfoundland
British Isles
BLUE Airlines Data
Eastern Canada
Along a line between
Cairo and Athens
Wind
230 to 260/60 to 110
240/35 to 50
Error
0 to 80 deg. and up to
70 kts.
40 to 50 deg.
(consistent with above findings)
250/65	 20 to 35 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-1 depicts the orientation of streamlines and
location of the 100 kt. and 50 kt. isotachs from the 250 mb.
analysis of OOZ August 7th. Maximum winds within the 100
kt. isotach were 115 kts.
The corresponding 250 mb. forecast chart valid at OOZ was
not available for review, but based upon review of the
forecasts valid at OOZ on August 6 and 12Z on August 7, and
the analysis at OOZ on August 6, one can comment on the
likely extent and significance of the forecast error.
These data indicate that the forecast of the shape, and
movement of the trough in eastern North America was quite
accurate. However, the wind speeds on the east side of the
trough were underestimated. Both of the forecast charts
showed maximum winds within a 70 kt, isotach east of the
trough even though the actual analyses showed winds up to
115 kts. at OOZ on August 6 as well as 24-hours later.
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DATE: August 6, 1979 (Continued)
The flight plan error segment data confirm these findings.
The segments with large direction errors were right in the
center cf the trough where the winds were light. The
segments on the east side of the trough generally had zero
to ten degree errors in direction but up to 70 kts. in
speed.
The forecast errors in the British Isles area are wind
direction errors only and appear to be the result of unfore-
cast deepening of the trough west of Ireland along with a
slower than expected easterly movement of the trough.
Available data do not extend far enough east to explain the
forecast error between Cairo and Athens.
I
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DATE: August 7, 1979
	 Westbound Flow
i
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 27 flights - 45 error segments
RED Airlines - 8 flights - 29 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wind	 Error
Vicinity of British
	 230 to 270/20 to 50
	 30 to 50 deg. and 8'C
Isles
Area Bounded by 20W,	 Variable/30 to 40	 40 to 60 deg. and 7 to 8°C
40W, 40N and SON
Area Bounded by 20W,
	 270/60 to 70	 25 to 30 kts. and 6 or 7°C
40W, 60N and 65N
BLUE Airlines Data
Mid-Atlantic
	 (consistent with above findings 20W to 40W)
Through Yugoslavia, 	 240 to 270/20 to 70 	 20 to 40 deg. and 25 kts.
Greece, Turkey, Iraq
ar. Iran
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-1 may be used for reference regarding the general
synoptic situation since it is based upon the August 7, OOZ
analysis. At OOZ on August 8 the situation was quite
similar but with the trough moving east to the vicinity
of Gander and filling slightly, the ridge in the Atlantic
moving to 35W and building, and the trough that was off the
Irish Coast moving east to the center of England with some
deepening. The area of maximum winds moved from the east
side of the trough to the top of the ridge and increased in
speed and areal extent. The August 8, OOZ analysis shows
maximum winds of 135 kts. extending from SON through 58N.
The forecast of the location of the m,•,or features was quite
accurate. However, the forecast did not show the building
of the ridge, overestimated the extent of the filling of the
a
n
23.
DATE: August 7, 1979 (Continued)
Gander trough, and projected filling of the trough over
England when it actually deepened. On the forecast the
maximum wind isotach was increased to 90 kts. at the to p of
the ridge, but as mentioned above, the actual maximum winds
in this area increased from 115 kts. to 135 kts. over this
24-hour period and the width of the band of 110 kt. winds
increased by some 300 nm.
All of the segment forecast errors in the British Isles
were largely direction errors only and are explained by
the unforecast deepening of the trough which changed the
orientation of the streamlines.
The wind direction errors in the area between 40N and 50N at
20W to 40W were the result of a mislocation of the closed
high at 30W. The errors were not significant operationally
in either of these areas.
There were not sufficient observational data on the NMC
analysis to explain the segment forecast errors in the Mid
East nor the temperature errors in the Mid North Atlantic.
s
Eastern Canada, entire
North Atlantic between
45N and 65N, and Western
Europe
Location
BLUE Airlines Data
Eastern North Atlantic
and Ireland
(consistent with above findings)
Wind
230 to 280/70 to 100
Error
30 to 160 deg., 20 to 25
kts., 12°C
24.
DATE: August 10, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 36 flights - 93 error segments
RED Airlines - 5 flights - 44 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Vicinity of Yugoslavia,	 240 to 270/40 to 70 	 30 to 40 deg. and 15 to
Turkey, Iraq and Iran	 25 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-2 presents streamlines and isotachs from the 250
mb. analysis valid at OOZ on August 11th for reference
during the following discussion.
From inspection of the 250 mb. analyses and forecasts valid
at OOZ on August 10 and August 11 it can be concluded that
the RED Airline data used in Task I for this day were
somewhat erroneous. The winds on the flight plans on the
forecasts and the flight plans on the analysis are substan-
tially different from the corresponding winds on the NMC
charts issued at those times.
In any case, even if the RED Airlines data are ignored,
several BLUE Airlines error segments and the NMC forecast
and analysis charts confirmed that wind forecast errors of
10 to 25 degrees and up to 24 kts. existed in the vicinity
of the ridge at 20W.
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26.
DATE: August 10, 1979 (Continued)
With respect to location, intensity and movement of the
major features, the forecast valid at OOZ on the 11th was
quite close to the actual analysis of Figure 4-2 except for
the orientation of the ridge at 20W. In the forecast the
ridge was oriented approximately along a line from 50112OW to
65N35W rather than in the north-south alignment shown in the
actual analysis. This accounted for the slight wind direc-
tion errors in the eastern North Atlantic.
The wind speeds were underestimated throughout the entire
period. The OOZ analysis of August 10th showed a band of
maximum winds 70 to 95 kts. about 300 nm. wide across the
top of the ridge and winds of up to 125 kts. on the west
side of the ridge. The 24-hour forecast for OOZ on the
11th, however, showed only 50 kt. isotachs extending across
the top of the ridge and a maximum wind area of more than 70
kts. in the west side of the ridge. The analysis valid at
OOZ on the 11th showed winds of up to 115 kts. extending to
the top of the ridge indicating the likelihood of errors up
to 50 to 65 kts. It is surprising that the BLUE Airlines
data only indicated errors of up to 24 kts.
Regarding the areas of forecast error in Eastern Europe and
the Mid East it appears that the wind direction errors in
the Yugoslavia area were caused by the forecast of the deep
trough in that area being some 200 miles east of its actual
position. Further into the Middle East, the height contours
are much more flat and at the edge of the available charts
and it is not possible to explain the forecast errors with
the available data.
27.
DATE: August 13, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 25 flights - 36 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
BLUE Airlines Data
Location
	
Wind
	
Error
Vicinity of 48N45W
	
270/50
	
10 deg. and 25 kts.
Vicinity of 53N50W
	
220/70
	
40 deg.
Vicinity of 56N35W
	
300/100
	
30 to 35 kts.
Eastern France
	
330 to 030/20 to 30
	
30 to 40 deg. and 20
to 30 kts.
Vicinity Turkey-Iran
	
230/90
	
20 to 25 kts.
DISCUSSION: Isotachs and streamlines in Figure 4-3 depict the actual
winds on the North Atlantic at OOZ August 14th. The errors
noted above for the North Atlantic area are based upon six
flight segments from four eastbound flights and two west-
bound flights. Thus, based on the BLUE Airlines data alone
the forecast errors do not appear to be significant.
However, review of the 250 mb. forecasts valid at OOZ on
August 13th and 12Z on August 14th (the OOZ forecast for
August 14th was not available) indicated that the location
and orientation of the major systems were forecast quite
accurately, but the maximum wind speeds were underestimated
throughout the entire period. The forecast valid at OOZ on
the 13th showed a narrow band of 110 kt. winds on the west
side of the mid-Atlantic trough (which was not yet as deep).
By 12Z of August 14th the maximum wind isotach in the west
side of the trough was 90 kts. and covered a band some 350
miles wide with a second area of 90 kt. winds on the east
side of the trough. The actual analyses showed maximum
winds of up to 150 kts. in a narrow band on the west side
through the bottom of the trough at OOZ on the 13th with 100
kt. winds on both sides of the trough similar to the OOZ
August 14th situation depicted in Figure 4-3.
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DATE: August 13, 1979 (Continued)
The relatively small errors in wind direction and speed in
eastern France were the result of the unexpected deepening
of the low centered in Yugoslavia. However, these were of
little operational significance.
29.
F
30.
DATE: August 14, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 32 flights - 60 error segments
RED Airlines - 9 flights - 42 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
British Isles, North Sea
Scandinavia
57N between 20W and 40W
Vicinity of 65N Between
1OW and 60W
BLUE Airlines Data
Vicinity 54N25W
Vicinity 54N50W
Vicinity Turkey, Iraq,
Iran
Wind
200 to 240/40 to 110
260 to 290/65 to 95
180 to 270/10 to 40
290/100
260/75 to 100
240 to 360/20 to 100
Error
20 to 50 deg. and 20
to 30 kts.
20 to 40 kts. 6°C
20 to 150 deg. and
20 to 25 kts.
20 to 40 kts.
20 to 30 kts.
20 to 60 deg. and 20
to 40 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-3 valid at OOZ on August 14th may be used for
reference during the following discussion. By OOZ on the
15th, the situation was similar except that the low south of
Hudson Bay moved eastward to southeastern Quebec and filled
slightly, the trough in the Mid-Atlantic moved eastward
about 12 degrees of latitude and deepened somewhat, the
ridge between them was approximately along the 40W meridian
and building, and the low in Yugoslavia deepened with a
ridge building between it and the Atlantic trough.
The winds were generally lighter throughout the entire area
with maximum winds of 125 kts. to 130 kts. in the west side
of the Atlantic trough and in the east side of the Quebec
trough. The width of the band of 100 kt. winds is reduced
to some 100 to 150 nm. throughout the Atlantic area.
31.
DATE: August 14, 1979 (Continued)
Inspection of the 250 mb. forecast valid at OOZ on August
15th suggests that the NMC model suffered a substantial
forecast "bust" on that day. It missed:
• The easterly movement and filling of the Quebec low,
leaving it centered in James Bay;
• The building of the ridge at 40W;
• The movement and deepening of the Atlantic trough,
leaving it centered at 15W about 3 to 5 degrees west
of its actual position;
• The development of the ridge in western Europe.
This resulted in a forecast with a more zonal orientation
of the streamlines across the ocean and forecast winds from
250 to 290 degrees. The sharper features resulted in actual
winds ranging from about 200 degrees to 320 degrees.
Because of its areal extent, it is likely that this forecast
error had a substantial operational impact on airlines. For
example, the RED Airlines data from Task I show that every
westbound flight had forecast errors on every segment from
the origin to landfall on the North American side of the
ocean.
DATE: August 17,	 1979 Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 38 flights - 87 error segments
32.
FORECAST ERRORS:
BLUE Airlines Data
Location
Vicinity of Gander to
50N40W
60N to 65N and 1OW
to 60W
Vicinity of England
and F: ante
Wind
230/75 to 95
270/20 to 40
300 to 320/70 to 90
Error
20 to 25 kts.
25 to 45 deg. and 7
to 8"C
25 to 35 kts.
20 to 30 kts.Eastern Europe Through	 240 to 290/20 to 80
Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia
and Greece
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-4 depicts the streamline and isotach fields that
existed at OOZ on August 18th, at 0e 250 mb. level.
Review of the 250 mb. forecast valid at OOZ on August 18th
and the analyses for OOZ on the 17th and the 18th verifies
that the forecast was actually quite good except for some
relatively small wind speed errors. Most of the error
segments were clustered around Newfoundland or around the
west coast of France and southwestern England. The wind
directions in the forecast were accurate but the speeds
were too low on both sides of the ridge in the Atlantic.
The forecast showed a maximum isotach value of 70 Kts. on
the west side of the ridge where the actual winds were up
to 110 kts. The actual winds above 100 kts. were in a very
narrow band, however, while the forecast area of 70 kts.
was up to 600 nm. wide. On the east side of the ridge, the
forecast 'showed maximum winds of 90 kts. and they were more
to the west and northwest of Ireland. Figure 4-4 shows that
the core of maximum winds was actually up to 110 kts. and
was further into the trough south and southeast of Ireland.
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34.
DATE: August 17, 1979 (Continued)
The other areas with error segments in eastern EuroF ,^ and
along 65N were both near the centers of lows where the flow
is ill-defined, the wind speeds are light, and the errors
are of little operational significance.
35.
DATE: August 20, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 24 flights - 29 error segments
RED Airlines - 7 flights - 13 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
France and England
BLUE Airlines Data
Southern and Eastern
Europe Through Austria,
Italy, Greece,
Yugoslavia, and Turkey
Wind
	
Error
240 to 260/30 to 80
	
25 to 35 kts.
350 to 020/15 to 35
	
30 to 50 deg.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-5 depicts the streamline and isotach fields over
Europe and the eastern North Atlantic, where all the error
segments occurred, for OOZ on August 21 at the 250 mb.
level.
Review of the 250 mb. forecast and analysis valid at OOZ
on August 21 makes it clear that the forecast was actually
quite accurate. The few error segments detected only by RED
Airlines data in western Europe were apparently the result
of sightly underestimating the extent of the deepening of
the low southeast of Iceland. The forecast 250 mb. height
contours showed a height of 10,210 meters at the center of
the low and the actual was approximately 10,150 meters. The
forecast included a maximum wind isotach of 70 kts. over
Ireland and the adjacent ocean area while the actual winds
were up to 105 kts. over Ireland and Scotland as Figure 4-5
shows.
Review of the forecast and analysis in the eastern European
area did not support the error segment findings above. The
forecast was nearly perfect in this area and the wind
direction errors on the BLUE Airlines flight plans must
have been the result of some other factor related to that
airline's flight planning system.
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37.
DATE: August 24, 1979	 Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 36 flights - 25 error segments
RED Airlines - 10 flights - 17 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
England and France
BLUE Airlines Data
Between 1OW, 5OW, 40N
and 45N
Wind
240 to 260/30 to 85
c30 to 210/30 to 85
Error
20 to 35 kts.
15 to 40 deg., 10 to
25 kts., 6°C
Over Iran	 260 to 280/23 to 36	 30 to 50 deg., 10 to
15 kts.
OISCUSSIO;.. Figure 4-6 shows the approximate streamline and isotach
fields from the 250 mb. analysis from OOZ on,August 25th.
Wind barbs indicate the location of several isolated
observations of 100 kts. or greater. These were not
extensive enough to include a 100 kt. isotach on a figure
of this scale.
Although it is not apparent from the information given
above, it turns out that all but one of the error segments
in the North Atlantic area were for westbound flights. As
such, it is likely that they operated on the 12Z prog. or
18Z prog. of August 24. Only the forecasts and analyses for
OOZ on August 24 and August 25 were available for review in
explaining these forecast errors.
The erroneous winds from the flight plans in Task I do not
match either the forecasts or analyses reviewed and, in
fact, the OOZ forecast is quite close to Figure 4-6, even
to the point of being within 10 kts. of the maximum winds
in the ridge in the middle of the Atlantic.
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DATE: August 24, 1979 (Continued)
From review of the OOZ forecast from August 24th it appears
that the NMC model underestimated the deepening and eastward
movement of the two troughs (one approximately at 5OW and
the other over the North Sea). This apparently carried
over to the 12Z and 18Z forecasts, resulting in the error
segments noted above, but was corrected by the forecast
valid at OOZ of August 25th which has the intensity and
location of these troughs depicted quite accurately.
In any event, the errors were relatively minor and were not
likely to be of any operational significance.
40.
DATE: September 7, 1981
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 34 flights - 42 error segments
RED Airlines - 10 flights - 102 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location Wind Error
British	 Isles 230 to 260/30 to 60 10 to 80 deg., 10 to
45 kts., and 6 or 7°C
Area Bounded by 60N, 260 to 300/40 to 90 20 to 160 deg., 30 to
67N,	 1OW and SOW 65 kts., and 8 to 10°C
Area Bounded by 43N, Variable/40 to 75 50 to 150 deg., 15 to
SON, 1OW and SOW 35 kts., and 6°C
Between, New York, 230 to 260/60 to 90 30 to 50 deg., 20 to
Gander, and 43N55W 50 kts.
Along a Line From 270/30 to 65 50 to 90 deg., 15 to
Montreal to 60N60W 25 kts., 6 to 9 °C
Along a Line From 270 to 300/20 to 70 30 to 60 deg., 10 to
Poste de la Baleine 20 kts., 3 to 9 °C
(GW)	 to Sault Ste.
Marie to Chicago
Along a Line From 290/20 to 50 40 deg. and 40 kts.
Thunder Bay to Salt
Lake City to Los
Angeles
BLUE Airlines Data
Vicinity of 58N15W	 290/40	 40 deg. and LO kts.
Vicinity of 64N25W	 290/60	 28 kts.
Vicinity of Turkey	 260 to 360/15 to 30	 30 to 50 deg. and 10
and Iran
	
to 25 kts.
41.
DATE: September 7, 1981 (Continued)
DISCUSSION: Review of the 250 mb. forecast and analysis valid at OOZ on
September 8th indicates that the extensive area of forecast
error indicated by the RED Airlines data did not in fact
exist. For the entire North Atlantic region and for eastern
North America, the forecast and actual were nearly identical.
The presence of only several isolated error segments in the
BLUE Airlines data further supports this conclusion.
By reference to the OOZ analysis for September 7th, it was
noted that the changes during this 24 hour period were rapid
and pronounced. Since all of the RED Airlines flights were
westbound it is likely that they were planned and operated
on a forecast valid for the middle of this period such as
the 12Z prog. of September 7th. The rapidly changing
situation may have caused the RED Airlines' time interpola-
tion scheme to produce apparent forecast errors at 12Z which
do not appear on the subsequent OOZ analysis.
The forecast error indicated by the RED Airlines data on
the Polar route between Thunder Bay, Salt Lake City and Los
Angeles was valid. A ridge just east of the Rocky Mountains
was not forecast to build as much as it did resulting in the
wind direction and speed errors of approximately 40 decrees
and 40 kts. Along most of this route segment this error
had the effect of changing expected winds from quartering
headwinds to headwinds and, as such, could have resulted
in time penalties of several minutes to these flights.
As in the previous discussions, no comments will be offered
regarding the BLUE Airlines forecast errors in the Mid East
area. The geographic extent of the available data is not
sufficient to ascertain the reason for the errors in this
region.
e
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DATE: September 10, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: RED Airlines - 12 flights - 33 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Along a Line From
70N40W to 66N20W to
61N10W to Prestwick
Area Between 30W, 55W,
48N and 60N
Vicinity Montreal
Wind
230 to 280/10 to 110
(40 to -50°C)
300/100
Error
0 to 80 deg., 0 to
20 kts., and 7 to
11°C
7 to 13°C
25 deg.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-7 depicts the approximate streamline and isotach
fields in the North Atlantic area at the 250 mb. level at
OOZ on September 11th. Several temperatures are shown in
boxes.
The wind forecast valid at that time was quite accurate,
even to the point of depicting the maximum wind speeds
within 10 kts. in the area south of Iceland.
The wind forecast errors encountered by the flight proceed-
ing northwest from Prestwick appear to have resulted from
two sources. The direction errors occurred in the segments
toward the center of the low where the flow is ill defined.
The principal speed errors were in the segments closer to
the British Isles and were the result of the maximum winds
indicated by the 100 kt. isotach moving slightly further
east than expected.
The isolated wind direction error in the vicinity of Montreal
cannot be confirmed by reference to the forecast or the analy-
sis. The wind on the 250 mb. forecast over Montreal is 270/85
and on the analysis it is 270/80. It must be concluded that
this apparent "error" was caused somehow in the RED Airlines
flight planning system's data handling algorithm.
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44.
DATE: September 10, 1979 (Continued)
The principal errors indicated above are temperature errors,
especially in the area between 30W and 55W. However, no
temperature observations were available in this area on the
250 mb. analysis and it is difficult to discuss or explain
the apparent forecast error without more data. For those
areas where temperature observations were available as
indicated by the boxes in Figure 4-7 the temperatures were
within 5°C of the forecast.
a
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DATE: September 14, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 21 flights - 19 error segments
RED Airlines - 2 flights - 7 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
a
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wini	 Error
Between 55N, 60N,	 200 to 220/60 to 100	 10 to 35 deg., 25
20W and 40W	 to 35 kts.
Between Cartwright	 290/110	 10 deg. and 20 to
and 55N50W	 30 kts.
BLUE Airlines Data
Same areas and errors as above plus:
Vicinity Western	 235/99	 41 kts. and 8°C
Pennsylvania
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-8 depicts the isotachs and streamlines for the 250
mb. level at OOZ on September 15th.
The 24-hour forecast valid at that time depicted the loca-
tion and intensity of the trough at 40W quite accurately.
However, the wind speeds on either side of the trough in the
area immediately adjacent to the center of the trough were
underestimated resulting in the error segments noted above.
These wind speed errors were much smaller than the typical
errors that were found on many of the dates discussed in the
preceding pages and were not likely to be of operational
significance to airlines. In fact, further east of the
trough, through the top of the ridge and down to the British
Isles, most of the wind speeds indicated were within 10 kts.
of forecast.
The error segments found in the vicinity of western
Pennsylvania could not be confirmed by reference to the
forecast and analysis charts. Wind speeds in this area were
about 80 kts. on the forecast and 90 kts. on the analysis.
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DATE: September 14, 1979 (Continued)
The previous OCZ forecast (for September 14th) called for
winds of 30 to 40 kts. in this area and it may be that the
BLUE Airlines error segments were the result of time inter-
polation or the choice of forecast period on which the
flight plan was made in this rapidly changing situation.
47.
48.
DATE: September 17, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 30 flights - 23 error segments
RED Airlines - 8 flights - 19 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wind	 Error
30W to 40W, 52N to 57N	 270/85 to 100	 20 to 25 kts., 5
to 9°C
Vicinity of 45W53N	 -	 6 to 11%
Vicinity of Gander	 270150	 21 kts.
Vicinity of Poste	 270/50 to 60	 20 to 30 kts., 6°C
de la Baleine
BLUE Airlines Data
57N15W	 270/110	 29 kts.
Eastern France,	 330 to 030/10 to 25	 40 to 70 deg.
Northwestern Italy
Along a Line From	 290 to 320/18 to 20	 30 to 100 deg. and
i	 69N80W to 70N70W to	 15 kts.
71N50W to 70N30W
N	 DISCUSSION: The approximate isotach and streamline fields from the 250
mb. level for OOZ on September 18th are shown in Figure 4-9.
The few temperature observations that were available for the
area of interest here are also shown in boxes in the figure.
Review of the 250 mb. analysis and forecast valid at OOZ on
September 18th indicates That the forecast of the locations
and intensities of the major synoptic features was quite
accurate in the middle North Atlantic area. However, as was
the case for many of the previous days reviewed, wind speeds
were generally underestimated. This is confirmed by the
dominance of speed errors rather than direction errors in
the error segments listed above.
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50.
DATE: September 17, 1979 (Continued)
The forecast chart showed a 90 kt. isotach in nearly the
same location as the 100 kt. isotach in Figure 4-9. Actual
wind speeds in this area were up to 145 kts.
Review of the forecast and analysis from 24 hours earlier
(OOZ on September 17th) revealed that maximum winds in this
area were also underestimated. The forecast did show a 110
kt. isotach but the actuals were as high as 140 kts.
Therefore, during the 24-hour period the forecasts reduced
the maximum isotach from 110 kts. to 90 kts. even though the
analysis showed maximums of 140 kts. increasing in speed to
145 kts. and in areal extent.
Sufficient observational data were not available to deter-
mine the cause of the temperature errors in the area between
30W and SOW. However, it was noted that the forecast
indicated a temperature of -42 at 5ON35W wi;ere the observed
temperature was -43. A RED Airlines error segment in this
vicinity noted a temperature difference of 8°C between
forecast and actual.
The isolated wind speed errors in the vicinity of Gander and
Poste-de-la-Baleine appear to be related to the unexpected
development of the small trough over Hudson Bay and the
adjacent r.idge in eastern Canada. The forecast showed
straight zonal flow throughout this area with winds of 70
kts. or more.
The wind direction errors in eastern France resulted from
the greater than forecast deepening of the low over Portugal
and another one in southwestern USSR, off the end of Figure
4-9. This caused a more northerly rather than northwesterly
orientation of the streamlines over western Europe.
Finally, the wind direction errors along the route from
69N8OW to 70N30W were judged to be of little significance
since they were in the center of the low where variable
winds and direction forecast errors are almost to be
expected.
:r
51.
DATE: September 21, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 34 flights - 66 error segments
RED Airlines - 11 flights - 41 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED 'irlines Data
Location
Vicinity Maine and
New Brunswick
Between 55N, 65N,
40W and 20W
England and Western
France
Wind
	
Error
270/115
	
21 kts.
240/90 to 125
	
20 to 45 kts., 8'C
350 to 364 110 to 135	 30 to 50 kts.
Eastern France
	
180/50 to 70
	
20 to 30 kts., 6%
de la Baleine
Between 1OW, 40W,	 Variable/10 to 30
	
30 to 160 deg., and
45N and 52N
	
0 to 15 kts.
BLUE Airlines Data
Mid-Atlantic segments consistent with those above.
Vicinity of Germany 010/60	 30 to 50 deg. and
and Austria 35 kts.
Yugoslavia, Greece 160 to 200/10 to 30	 30 to 50 deg.,	 and
0 to 35 kts.
Vicinity of Turkey, 230 to 330/16 to 26	 30 to 60 deg.	 and
Iraq and Iran 5 to 15 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-10 is a sketch of the streamline and isotach fields
that existed at the 250 mb. level on September 22, 1979 at
OOOOZ. The situation in the North Atlantic area, where most
of the error segments were found, was dominated by the
strong ridge along 20W and the deep trough over western
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DATE: September 21, 1979 (Continued)
Europe. Reference to the previous OOZ analysis showed that
this ridge and trough had developed rapidly and, although
the locations were accurately forecast, the extent of the
development was underestimated on the 250 mb. chart valid
at OOZ on September 22.
The principal problem with this forecast, however, was the
underestimated wind speeds throughout the ridge and trough,
and in eastern North America as well. On the forecast,
maximum winds in the vicinity of Maine and New Brunswick
were enclosed by a 90 kt. isotach when they were actually
100 to 120 kts. in this area. On the west side of the
ridge, maximum winds on the forecast were enclosed by a 90
kt. isotach of approximately the same size and in the same
location as the 100 kt. isotach in Figure 4-10. Actual
winds in this area were up to 140 kts. On the east side
of the ridge, over the British Isles and through western
France, the forecast showed a maximum wind isotach of 70
kts. where the actual winds were over 100 kts. with several
observations of up to 150 kts, reported.
In each of these areas the previous analysis showed exten-
sive areas of winds greater than 100 kts. with many obser-
vations of winds up to 150 kts. suggesting that even a
simple persistence or continuity forecast would have called
for higher and thus more accurate wind speeds.
On the east side of the trough through eastern France,
Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia and Greece error segments were
more the result of wind direction rather than speed errors.
An unforecast low was developing over Turkey (beyond the
area covered in Figure 4-10) which caused the secondary
trough to develop extending to the southeast over Corsica.
This caused a more southerly direction for the winds east
of the main trough rather than the generally southwest
direction that had been forecast.
53.
DATE: September 24, 1979	 Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: RED Airlines - 6 flights - 16 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
54.
RED Airlines Data
Location
Along the Route From
Chicago to Ottawa to
Montreal
Maine, New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia
Wind	 Error
240 to 250/83 to 99	 22 to 23 kts.
250 to 270/112 to 118 	 28 to 31 kts.
DISCUSSION: The forerist errors identified above were restricted to a
small arez in the eastern United States and Canada. Figure
4-11 describes the situation that existed in this area at
OOZ on September 25th. It appears that the deepening trough
in the midwest influenced the winds in the area of forecast
error. This forecast, and the one issued 24 hours earlier,
showed a tendency toward decreasing wind speeds in the
trough as it developed, and moved the stronger winds further
east.
Actually the analysis showed that wind speeds did diminish
substantially right along the centerline of the trough but
remained strong to the east of the trough over the areas
where the forecast errors occurred.
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56.
DATE: September 28, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines- 44 flights - 64 error segments
RED Airlines - 13 flights - 53 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Northern Italy,
Southeastern
France
Vicinity of Ireland
20W to 30W,
5OW to 6ON
30W to 40W,
5ON to 60N
40W to 5OW,
5ON to 60N
Southeastern Quebec
and Newfoundland
Wind
330/20
290/20 to 35
180 to 190/65 to 90
160 to 260/30 to 45
270 to 290/40 to 85
270/110
Error
45 to 60 deg.
40 to 50 deg.
10 to 35 deg. and 25
to 40 kts.
30 to 60 deg. and 17
to 35 kts.
30 to 10 deg. and 30
to 45 kts.
20 to 25 kts.
BLUE Airlines Data
(North Atlantic segments consistent with above findings)
Vicinity of Greece,
	
260 to 290/10 to 55	 20 to 40 deg., 15 to
Eastern Mediterranean	 25 kts. and 5 to 7°C
and Northern Egypt
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-12 presents streamlines and isotachs representative
of the 250 mb. level at OOZ on September 29th.
The extensive area of wind forecast errors over the North
Atlantic appears to be the result of unexpected development
of the low south of Greenland. Reference to the previous
OOZ analysis and forecast shows that this low deepened more
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58.
DATE: September 28, 1979 (Continued)
rapidly than expected. The 250 mb. forecast valid at OOZ on
September 29th showed a trough in this region with a 250 mb.
height value of 10,150 meters just south of Greenland. The
actual analysis showed a closed-off low at this point
within a 9,960 meter height contour. Some observations of
easterly winds greater than 50 kts. were shown in southern
Greenland. This error in the location and intensity of this
low resulted in the wind direction errors over the British
Isles and west to 2014, and in the direction and speed errors
further west around the center of the low.
The wind speed forecast errors further to the west over
eastern Canada appear to have been less related to the error
in forecasting the development of the low. These errors of
20 to 35 kts. are more likely the result of the tendency to
underforecast the maximum winds. The forecast valid at OOZ
on the 29th showed a 70 kt. isotach in just about the same
location as the 100 kt. isotach in Figure 4-12.
The forecast errors in eastern Europe, the Mid-East and
North Africa are the result of the poorly defined flow
around the weak high and low in Spain and the Mediterranean.
The locations of the centers of the high and low were missed
slightly by the forecast. The error was not significant but
was sufficient to cause the wind direction errors noted.
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DATE: October 5, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: RED Airlines - 8 flights - 31 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Area Bounded by Quebec,
Ottawa and New York
Vicinity of 55N50W
Area Between Ireland,
30W, 5ON and 58N
Wind
180/100 to 120
290/85 to 90
090 to 180/20 to 65
Error
25 to 35 kts.
20 to 25 kts.
30 to 130 deg. and 0
to 40 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-13 describes the approximate streamline and isotach
fields that existed on October 5th. The figure was actually
derived from the 12Z analysis of October 6th since the OOZ
analysis was not available.
The situation that existed on October 5th and the reason
for the forecast errors in the North Atlantic area was quite
similar to the last day reviewed - September 28th. Here
again the forecast valid at OOZ on October 6th shows a much
less developed trough in the eastern Atlantic. As Figure
4-13 shows, the more developed, closed low at 2OW resulted
in more southeasterly and easterly winds in this area
whereas the forecast with the less developed trough showed
winds from the south to south-southwest.
The other two forecast error areas, in the vicinity of 5OW
and in the vicinity of New York, appear to be the result of
misplacement and underforecast of the maximum wind areas in
the ridge centered at 5OW. The forecast did not show this
ridge building as much and it showed an area of maximum
winds bounded by a 90 kt. isotach through the ridge where
Figure 4-13 shows winds of 100 kts. or more.
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61.
DATE: October 8, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 18 flights - 33 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
	 I
BLUE Airlines Data
Location
Between 6OW, 20W,
45N and SON
Vicinity of 52N15W
Over Iran, Pakistan
Wind
260 to 290/85 to 110
180 tO 210/30 to 50
200 to 225/35 to 60
Error
10 deg. and 20 to
45 kts.
30 to 75 deg.
30 to 50 deg. and 15
to 30 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-14 depicts the approximate streamline and isotach
fields for the 250 mb. level valid at OOOOZ October 9th,
which corresponds with the time most of the BLUE Airlines
flights were operating.
The 250 mb. forecast valid at the same time was not avail-
able for review, but based upon the forecast valid at 12Z
on October 8th, the NMC analysis valid at OOZ on October
8th, and an operational airline analysis valid at OOZ on
October 9th, it appears that the forecast errors in the Mid
Atlantic were the result of unexpected building of the ridge
at 45W and deepening of the low at 20W.
Wind speeds were underestimated, as well, on both sides of
the ridge at 45W. The 12Z forecast showed maximum isotachs
of 90 kts. in just about the same locations as the 100 kt.
isotachs in Figure 4-14. A small area southeast of Halifax
was enclosed in a 110 kt. isotach.
From the data that were available, it appears that actual
wind speeds in these areas were up to 140 kts.
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63.
DATE: October 12, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 27 flights - 14 error segments
RED Airlines - 7 flights - 10 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wind	 Error
Cartwright to 57N40W
	 230/70	 25 kts.
Stornaway to 63N20W
	 260/35	 0 to 40 deg. and 15
to 20 kts.
BLUE Airlines Data
Vicini.;	 f 53N45W
	 250/105	 15 deg. and 25 kts.
DISCUSSION: No new figure is included to depict the winds on October
12th since the forecast errors listed above are few and
proved to be relatively insignificant. Figure 4-14 may
be used for general orientation since the situation at 250
mb. was similar on October 12th to that of October 9th. The
low in the eastern Atlantic was deeper and centered at
approximately 46NO5W. The low in eastern Canada had also
intensified while the Mid-Atlantic ridge ;gad flattened
somewhat.
The data which were available for review included only the
250 mb. analysis for OOZ October 12th, the forecast for OOZ
of October 13th, and the analysis for 12Z of October 13th.
From the data available, it is apparent that in a general
sense the forecast appears to be quite accurate. Even the
maximum wind speeds appear to be within 10 to 20 kts. of
forecast.
The error segments that were found by RED and BLUE Airlines
are widely scattered and of little operational significance.
Wind
240/85
340 to 360/30 to 110
Error
22 kts.
7 to 110C
20 to 120 deg. and
15 to 40 kts.
64.
DATE: October 15, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 21 flights - 34 error segments
RED Airlines - 9 flights - 45 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Newfoundland
20W to 40W Between
45N and 57N
British Isles, Western
France and Adjacent
Ocean East of 20W
BLUE Airlines Data
5OW to 30W Between	 230 to 250/95 to 115	 10 to 20 deg., 15
48N and 57N	 to 40 kts. and 5 to
9°C
France and Spain	 270 to 340/10 to 25	 35 to 65 deg. and
10 to 15 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-15 depicts the approximate streamlines and isotachs
at the 250 mb. level for OOOOZ October 16th.
The only data that were available for review for this day
were the 250 mb. NMC analysis valid at OOZ October 15th and
an airline 250 mb. analysis valid at OOZ on October 16th.
The only forecast data available were the NMC Trop and
Vertical Wind Shear prog. valid at OOZ on October 15th
and the winds and temperatures from the flight plan error
segments. Therefore, it was not possible to make specific
cornments on the forecast errors.
It is apparent that the errors in the vicinity of the
British Isles are related to the development and movement
of the trough in that area. Some of the flight plan error
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DATE: October 15, 1979 (Continued)
segments may be the result of time interpolation in this
rapidly changing area.
Comparison of the RED and BLUE error segments in the Mid-
Atlantic area indicates that they may also be partly the
result of choice of prog. or time interpolation. The RED
flights were mostly eastbound and the error segments mostly
occurred east of 40W. They were mostly temperature errors.
The BLUE flights were also mostly eastbound but the error
segments occurred between 5OW and 30W and were mostly wind
speed errors.
66.
67.
DATE: October 19, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 29 flights - 25 error segments
RED Airlines - 6 flights - 18 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wind	 Error
Vicinity of 53N50W	 330/150	 30 kts.
20W to 30W, SOW to 60N	 180 to 220/65 to 85 	 25 to 30 kts.
England and North Sea	 090 to 140/25 to 35	 40 to 70 deg.
BLUE Airline: Data
Austria Vicinity
Iran, Iraq Vicinity
030/60
220 to 300/20 to 60
30 deg. and 10 kts.
10 to 45 deg. aor,
20 to 45 kts.
DISCUSSION: No figure is included to describe the wind and temperature
fields for October 19th. After reviewing the available
forecast and analysis data it was determined that the
forecast was actually quite accurate and the error segments
above were either insignificant or not confirmed by the
forecast data.
A weak trough fluctuated aimlessly about eastern Europe
resulting in rapidly varying wind directions and causing
the BLUE Airlines error segments.
In the North Atlantic area, the analyses and forecasts valid
at OOZ on October 19th and 20th were almost identical, and
the absence of any error segments on five westbound BLUE
Airlines flights partially confirms this. The RED Airlines
error segments were all from eastbound flights which presum-
ably operated 12 hours later, were relatively small errors
in segments around a Mid-Atlantic trough, and could likely
have been partly the result of time interpolation or the
choice of prog. on which the flight plans were based.
68.
DATE: October 26, 1979	 Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 20 flights - 18 error segments
RED Airlines - 5 flights - 15 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Maine, New Brunswick,
and Southern Quebec
British Isles
BLUE Airlines Data
Vicinity of 63N15W
Wind
220 to 230/60 to 90
Variable/10 to 30
200 to 210/60 to 80
Error
10 deg. and 20 to 30
kts.
30 to 45 deg. and zero
to 10 kts.
35 deg. and 20 to 30
kts.
Eastern Europe and	 220 to 300/20 to 55	 10 to 45 deg. and
Middle East Through	 10 to 45 kts.
Austria, Greece,
Turkey, Iraq and
Iran
DISMISSION: Figure 4-16 depicts the approximate streamlines and isotachs
for OOOOZ on :•-tuber 27th.
The high and low over Europe resulted in relatively light
and variable winds and poorly defined flow, and account for
most of the error segments listed above.
All of the RED and BLUE flights were westbound and tended
to be north of the maximum winds, where the forecast errors
were insignificant, until they reached eastern Canada. Even
though there were no flight plan error segments there to
confirm it, a more significant forecast error occurred to
the south in the area of maximum winds. The forecast called
for maximum winds between 90 and 110 kts. in an area approxi-
mately identical in width to the area enclosed by the 100
kt. isotach in Figure 4-16 but extending further down into
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70.
GATE: October 26, 1979 (Continued)
the trough across Nova Scotia to about 40N68W. Actual winds
in this area were over 100 kts. with a number of winds of
130 to 155 kts. observed. 	 `
71.
DATE: November 2, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 31 flights - 42 error segments
RED Airlines - 3 flights - 20 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location	 Wind	 Error
Southern Ontario and	 230/98 to 105	 20 to 40 kts.
Great Lakes Area
52NSOW	 270/110	 22 kts.
Area Bounded by	 220 to 240/70 to 160	 10 to 40 deg. and 20
49N40W, 51N20W,
	
to 55 kts.
55NO5W and 61NIOW
Eastern France	 280 to 360/45 to 130	 0 to 60 deg. ana 0
Through Italy to	 to 35 kts.
Greece
BLUE Airlines Data
(Segments consistent with findings above for North Atlantic Ocean areas.)
Western France	 360 to 040/60 to 95 	 15 to 20 deg and 20
Through Spain	 to 25 kts.
Through Belgium,	 340 to 010/85 to 125	 15 to 30 deg. and
Germany, Eastern	 15 to 35 kts.
France, and Italy
Vicinity of Iran 	 150 to 220/15 to 25	 50 to 100 deg. and
10 to 15 kts.
DISCUSSION: The approximate wind field over the North Atlantic North
America and Europe at OOOOZ on November 3rd is dep' ted by
250 mb. level streamlines and isotachs in Figure 4-17.
The only data which were available to explain the forecast
errors listed above were the NMC 250 mb. analysis and fore-
cast valid at OOOOZ on November 2nd, the 250 mb. analysis
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73.
DATE: November 2, 1979 (Continued)
valid at 1200Z on November 3rd, and the 250 mb. forecast
valid at OOOOZ on November 3rd.
Most of the westbound flights which observed the error
segments listed above would have been operating between
120OZ and 180OZ on November 2nd, in between the time periods
for which data were available. As a result, it is suspected
that some of the forecast errors, especially those over the
western Atlantic and North America, were caused by time
interpolation or choice of prog. since the forecast appears
to be quite accurate in these areas.
The extensive area of wind speed errors in the eastern
Atlantic, and direction and speed errors over Europe are the
result of underestimated wind speeds throughout the ridge and
a slightly more than expected building of the ridge. The
forecast showed an area of maximum winds on the west side of
the ridge enclosed by a 110 kt. isotach which extended from
30W to 20W and from about 50N to 57N at its point of maximum
width. The maximum wind decreased to 70 kts. at the too of
the ridge and increased to 90 kts. on the east side of the
ridge over the North Sea and down into Belgium and France.
Reference to Figure 4-17 shows that significantly stronger
winds were observed throughout the ridge. Maximum winds of
125 kts. were observed on the west side and through the top
of the ridge while winds of 150 to 165 kts. were found on
the east side.
74.
DATE: November 5, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 28 flights - 2 error segments
RED Airlines - 2 flights - 24 error segments
(All data from eastbound RED Airlines flights were dis-
carded for this day. See Task I report.)
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Boston to Halifax
SOW to 30W, 45N to
5ON
30W to 1OW, 48N to
52N
Southern England and
Northern France
BLUE Airlines Data
Southwestern France
Wind
260 to 270/50 to 80
270 to 280/65 to 85
220 to 240/20 to 75
240 to 270/25
300/45
Error
0 to 21 kts. and 7°C
50 to 60 deg. and 15 to
25 kts.
30 to 45 deg., 5 to 60
kts. and 5°C
30 to 65 deg., 50 to 85
kts, and 5 to 6°C
25 kts.
DISCUSSION: Upon review of the NMC 250 mb. forecast valid at OOOOZ on
November 6th and an operational airline analysis for that
time it became apparent that the forecast for this day was
highly accurate. No BLUE Airlines error segments were
found, further confirming the accuracy of the forecast.
While the relatively minor RED Airlines error segments in
the western Atlantic and on the East Coast of North America
appear to be legitimate, those on the eastern side of the
ocean and in Europe were not consistent with the NMC fore-
cast data or the analysis and it was assumed that this day
was erroneously identified as having forecast errors.
75.
DATE: November 9, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 42 flights - 21 error segments
RED Airlines - 13 flights - 10 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location Wind Error
Between Madrid and 320/56 to 76 25 to 35 deg.	 and 25 to
41N20W 35 kts.
Switzerland, Eastern 240/88 17 deg. and 23 kts.
France
Along a Line from 240/121 to 127 10 deg., 22 kts.	 and 10°C
Detroit to Montreal
BLUE Airlines Data
Between Seattle and 	 3x0/52	 32 deg. and 15 kts.
Los Angeles
Southern Ontario,	 250/121	 25 kts.
Western New York
Eastern U.S. Approxi- 	 240 to 250/125	 25 kts.
mately Along a Line
From Houston to
Montreal
Southwestern Spain	 290/50	 23 deg. and 32 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figures 4-18 and 4-19 describe the approximate wind fields
over the United States and Europe at OOOOZ on November 10,
1979.
While the NMC analysis and forecast valid at that time were
not available for review, those for OOZ on November 9th and
120OZ on November 10th were. These data show that the ridge
off the West Coast of the U.S. was in the process of flatten-
ing throughout this period while the trough to the east of
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DATE: November 9, 1979 (Continued)
it was intensifying. This likely caused the relatively
minor errors in wind direction and speed that were noted
between Seattle and Los Angeles.
The OOZ data for November 9th show a more extensive area
of forecast error over the eastern half of the U.S. The
forecast showed maximum winds enclosed by a 70 kt. isotach
that extended from Minnesota through Iowa, Missouri,
Tennessee and North Carolina. The analysis showed winds of
100 to 130 kts. extending from Texas up through New England
and 70 kt. winds down into the Gulf Coast, similar to Figure
4-18. By 120OZ of November 10th the forecast was for winds
above 110 kts. in an area extending from Kentucky and
Indiana up through southeastern Quebec and, as Figure 4-18
shows, was quite accurate. The plans which resulted in the
error segments listed above were based on forecasts valid
during the intervening hours.
Figure 4-19 shows that western Europe was dominated by a
trough centered along DOW. The figure includes 70 kt. and
90 kt. isotachs to show the sharp gradient of the wind
speeds on both sides of the trough where the forecast errors
occurred. Since review of the NMC fo g -- asts and analyses
show that the forecasts were nearly pe. , pct in this region,
it is suspected that the error segments noted above could
be the result of th? airline data interpolation schemes in
areas where the wind speed gradient is sharp. In these
areas the wind speeds at adjacent Marsden Square data points
can differ by 50 to 100 kts. and it is possible that errors
of the magnitude noted above (10 to 35 degrees and 15 to 35
kts.) can result from the algorithm used to determine
segment average winds.
78.
79.
DATE: November 12, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 33 flights - 8 error segments
"i RED Akl ':nes - 6 flights - 40 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
Nova Scotia,
Newfoundland
5OW to 2OW, 55N to
6ON
British Isles and
France
BLUE Airlines Data
55N20W to 55N40W
Wind
240 to 270/5 to 35
150 to 210/20 to 70
090 to 190/20 to 50
27/125
Error
30 to 125 deg. and 0
to 35 kts.
50 to 150 deg. and 15
to 25 kts.
70 to 80 deg., 0 to 20
kts. and 5 to 74C
20 to 25 kts.
.
DISCUSSION: Review of the NMC 250 mb, forecasts valid at 120OZ on
November 12th and OOOOZ on November 11th, and the Delta
Airlines analysis valid at OOOOZ c 	 e 13th revealed
that the RED Airlines segments above were erroneously
identified as errors. All the RED Airlines flight plan
winds throughout the North Atlantic were from the south,
southeast or east and few were stronger than 30 kts. The
BLUE Airlines data, the forecast and the analysis all showed
westerly winds of over 100 kts. in this area.
Disregarding the erroneous RED Airlines data, the remainder
of the data showed that the forecast was very good except
for a small area at the center cF the maximum winds as
indicated by the BLUE Airlines data. The OOZ forecast
called for maximum winds greater than 130 kts. in the area
bounded approximately by 6OW, 55N, 30W and SON. Several
observations of 155 kts. were recorded in this area and the
three BLUE Airlines error segments in this area were only
off by 21 to 25 kts. These were fudged to be relatively
insignificant errors.
80.
DATE: November 16, 1979	 Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 34 flights - 10 error segments
RED Airlines - 10 flights - 56 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
^ED Airlines Data
Location
Through England
and France
Along a Line From
Cork to 49N20W to
47N3OW to 46N40W
Area Bounded by 57N,
63N, 1OW and 40W
BLUE Airlines Data
Vicinity of 53N35W
Vicinity of 60N25W
Switzerland, Italy
and Eastern
Mediterranean
Turkey, Iraq
and Iran
Wind
340 to 360/105 to 130
240 to 300/35 to 95
240 to 280/70 to 130
260/135
250/105
200 to 220/70 to 90
240/60 to 80
Error
20 to 50 kts.
15 to 20 deg., 20 to 32
kts. and 6°C
10 to 20 deg. and 30 to
50 kts.
23 kts.
25 kts.
15 to 40 deg., 20 to 30
kts. and 6"C
35 to 40 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-20 is an estimation of the winds that existed at
OOOOZ an November 17th when most of the flights above were
operating. NMC 250 mb. analyses and forecasts were only
available for OOOOZ on November 16th and 120OZ on November
17th.
During the 36-hour period between OOZ on the 16th and 12Z on
the 17th several changes were occurring relatively rapidly.
The center line of the trough in the western Atlantic moved
from 8OW to 60W, the ridge extending from the Azores high
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DATE: November 16, 1979 (Continued)
moved from a straight north-south orientationto a line from
the Azores to Northern France, and the trough over Europe
moved about 12 to 15 degrees eastward. The intervening
location of these features during the time RED and BLUE
Airlines flights were operating, can only be estimated.
DesFite the rapid changes, 12 BLUE Airlines flights across
the Atlantic encountered only three error segments in the
areas shown above, and six more in the Switzerland, Italy,
eastern Mediterranean area. Again despite the rapid changes,
both forecasts were quite accurate in locating these features.
It is difficult to explain why there were numerous RED
Airlines error segments under the same conditions, and so
few BLUE Airlines error segments. The errors were confirmed,
however, by review of the NMC data. The forecasts showed
maximum wind isotachs of 130 kts. in the same relative
locations as the 150 kt. isotachs in Figure 4-20. The
analysis showed extensive areas of wind stronger than 150
kts. in these regions and a number of winds of 180 to 190
kts. were observed both on the west side of the ridge and
over Weste^n France and Spain as well.
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DATE: November 19, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 34 flights - 8 error segments
RED Airlines - 12 flights - 11 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
SIM15W to Cork to
London
Vicinity of 56N20W
BLUE Airlines Data
Wind
330 to 360/30 to 50
230/75 to 115
Error
30 deg. and zero to 15
kts.
26 to 30 kts.
Vicinity 54N30W
	
230/90 to 95	 21 to 27 kts.
DISCUSSION: Review of the NMC 250 mb. forecast valid at OOOOZ November
20th, an airline 250 mb. analysis valid at the same time,
and the flight plan error segments listed above suggested
that the forecast was actually quite accurate. The number
of error segments was small and they missed the error
criteria by small amounts.
Figure 4-21 is a copy of a portion of the NMC 250 mb.
forecast valid at OOOOZ November 20th. Wind barbs in the
figure represent segment winds from flight plans on the
analysis that were included as error segments from Task I.
The wind barbs in boxes were from BLUE Airlines flights.
It is apparent from Figure 4-21 that the forecast; errors on
this day were relatively insignificant.
The wind barbs in the figure also give an example of an
inconsistency that was found to be typical throughout the
Task IV analysis. Note that between 20W and 30W a BLUE
Airlines error segment indicated that the actual wind was
230/95. The identical RED Airlines segment (the locations
of the segments are actually identical but the wind barbs
were separated for clarity) indicated a wind of 230/115.
Since a 90 kt. isotach passes throu gh the center of the
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DATE: November 19, 1979 (Continued)
segment, the BLUE Airlines wind obviously is within the 20
kt. error critericn. However, since it was identified as an
error segment, a difference greater than 20 kts. must have
existed and since the actual wind is in agreement, the wind
on the forecast flight plan must have differed by more than
20 kts. The same comment applies to the BLUE Airlines wind
barb between 40W and 30W which is nearly on the 90 kt.
isotach.
These data show two inconsistent findings. First, the
segment winds on the flight plan on the actual weather
developed by the RED and BLUE Airlines differed by 20 kts.
even though they were developed for the same segment and
from the same weather data. Second, the BLUE Airlines
segment winds on the forecast flight plan must have been
230/68 and 230/70 for the 40W to 30W and 30W to 20W seg-
ments, respectively, neither of which seems consistent
with the forecast depicted in Figure 4-21.
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DATE: November 23, 1979
	
Westbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 44 flights - 28 error segments
RED Airlines - 14 flights - 35 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines Data
Location
British Isles, North
Sea and Northern
France
Vicinity Quebec City
Vicinity of Hopedale,
Labrador
BLUE Airlines Data
Through Germany,
Switzerland, Italy
and Eastern
Mediterranean
Wind
230 to 240/65 to 90
270/75
330/75
220 to 290/20 to 35
Error
10 to 40 deg. and 25 to
45 kts.
10 deg. and 25 kts.
10 deg. and 25 kts.
30 to 45 deg.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-22 depicts the approximate streamlines and isotach
field at OOOOZ on November 24, 1979.
The relevant data that were available to review the signif-
icance of the above forecast errors consisted of the OOOOZ
250 mb. analysis for November 23rd, the 120OZ analysis for
November 24th and the OOOOZ forecast for November 24th.
Since most of the flights that observed the r.bove forecast
errors operated between 120OZ on the 23rd and OOOOZ on the
24th, the flight plan segment winds were likely developed
on forecasts and analyses with valid times between those
just mentioned. As such it is difficult to explain exactly
how the forecast errors listed above occurred.
It appears that the wind direction and speed errors in
Europe were related to the varying development of the low
near Italy and the trough extending from that low which was
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DATE: November 23, 1979 (Continued)
	`
centered approximately along 30E at OOOOZ on the 23rd, 5W on
the 24th OOOOZ forecast, and 5E on the 24th 120OZ analysis.
Although no forecast error segments were encountered in the
Mid-Atlantic area, review of the available data indicates
that wind speeds were underestimated across the North
Atlantic as well as through the ridge on the East Coast of
North America. To the extent that it can be established
from the available analyses, it appears that maximum winds
of 100 to 110 kts. were observed in the small area west of
Ireland and winds of 115 to 125 kts. were observed within
the larger 100 kt. isotach area in the East Coast ridge.
The OOOOZ forecast for the 24th showed only a small area of
70 kt. winds centered about 5ON30W and a small area of 110
kt. winds at the top of the ridge.
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DATE: November 26, 1979
	
Eastbound Flow
DATA SOURCES: BLUE Airlines - 26 flights - 5 error segments
RED Airlines - 7 flights - 37 error segments
FORECAST ERRORS:
RED Airlines.Data
Location
	
Wind
	
Error
New Brunswick,	 6 to 7°C
Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland
British Isles, France
and Adjacent Ocean
East of 20W
Vicinity of 5ON to 55N
at 30W
BLUE Airlines Data
Vicinity of 53N15W
340 to 020/60 to 105
Variable/5 to 30
210/105
10 to 30 deg. and 20
to 40 kts.
30 to 110 deg.
21 kts.
DISCUSSION: Figure 4-23, which was recreated from the Delta Airlines
analysis, depicts the streamlines and isotachs at the 250
mb. level for OOOOZ on November 27, 1979, which was the
apprrximate time during which most of the RED and BLUE.
eastbound North Atlantic flights were operating.
The NMC OOOOZ analysis for November 26th and the 250 mb.
prog. for OOOOZ of the 26th, along with an airline opera-
tional analysis and the presence of only one minor BLUE
Airlines error segment at 53N15W, failed to confirm that the
RED Airlines error segments listed above existed. The RED
Airlines error segments were apparently based on erroneous
data and this date should not have been selected for further
review.
The wind barbs plotted on Figure 4-23 are the segment winds
from the RED Airlines flight plans an the actual weather.
It is obvious that these winds could not have been developed
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